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lntroducJion 
Envisioned by Lenin and molded by Stalin, the Soviet Union, 
and its communist economic system, lasted seventy-four years, from 
1917 to 1991. The inception of communism in the Soviet Union was 
a result of the losses Russia incurred during World War I. 
Devastation during the war and mismanagement by the government 
throughout created an atmosphere ripe for revolution. With the 
leadership of Lenin, the Bolshevik Revolution occurred in November 
1917, and the Communist Party was created in March 1918 .1 
Although there are early hints of communism in Plato's 
Republic, where he described his vision of an ideal republic in which 
all things are held in common, modern theories of communism were 
developed as a reaction to the severe income-inequality, squalor, and 
poverty which resulted from the industrial revolution.2 In 
particular, Karl Marx laid out his theory of communism to provide 
solutions to these problem in his Das Kapital. According to Marx, 
there are two stages of communism. The first stage is called 
socialism; the second, and final stage of historical development, is 
commumsm. Although the Soviet Union considered itself socialist, "it 
was a state-directed society that sought to fuse all realms into a 
single monolith and to impose a common direction, from economics to 
politics to culture, through a single institution, the Communist 
Party. " 3 While Marx envisioned a communist system without 
1 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Inc., 1994. P. 995-1022. 
2Dalton, George. Economic Systems & Society. Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books,
Ltd., 1974. P. 67-94. 
3Schnitzer. Martin C. Comparative Economic Systems. Cincinnati, OH: South­
Western Publishing Co., 1994. P. 42. 1 
government, scarcity, conflict, or classes, the communism of the 
Soviet Union deviated from vision of Marx and Lenin. The Soviet 
Union implemented one variation of communism, often referred to as 
bureaucratic collectivism. 4
The economic system of the Soviet Union was Marxist-Leninist, 
following their ideological guidelines for various institutional 
arrangements. For example, the Soviet government engaged in 
comprehensive economic planning. The purpose of this planning was 
to allocate resources without waste, determine output and the 
distribution of the output. According to communist theory, the 
planning would result in reduced waste of resources, while avoiding 
the duplication of goods and services, conspicuous consumption, and 
unnecessary product differentiation.5 In addition to economic 
planning, the state claimed ownership of all property; property being 
capital and land. Finally, the concentration of power was in the 
Communist Party, which was supposed to represent the interests of 
the working class. Beyond retaining total control of political power, 
the Communist Party was involved in all phases of economic activity. 
In all collective farms, military units, factories, and organizations, the 
Communist Party maintained local units or cells to maintain influence 
over the majority. the working class, the bourgeoisie.6 In every 
aspect of life, communism represented "cooperation". Individualism 
4Meyer, Alfred G. Communism. New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 1967. P.
11-22.
5Schnitzer, Martin c. Comparative Economic Systems. Cincinnati, OH: South­
Western Publishing Co., 1994. P. 11. 
6Schnitzer, Martin C. Comparative Economic Systems. Cincinnati. OH: South­
Western Publishing Co., 1994. P. 42. 2 
was supposed to be replaced by cooperation as every citizen worked 
together to develop the perfect society. 
Although Lenin and his Communist Party took control of the 
government in 1917, they did not convert the Soviet Union into a 
completely communist state. For example, Lenin's government 
adopted a policy of flexibility, permitting the use of some incentives 
of a market system. Their policy was called the New Economic 
Policy. During this period, farmers were even allowed to sell their 
products in an open market. Yet, Lenin died in 1924, and his 
successor, Joseph Stalin, implemented a more strict form of 
communism. Stalin was the leader of the Soviet Union from 1924 to 
1953, during which time he was able to achieve the complete 
socialization of agriculture and industry. 7 
Economic planning was established as Stalin inaugurated his 
first of many five-year plans. Setting production targets for every 
sector of the economy and collectivizing agriculture, Stalin set a high 
pace of industrial growth, and, in tum, neglected agricultural 
production. This neglect lead to constant shortages in agriculture. 
Moreover, Stalin ordered the death of some 20 million Russians as he 
became paranoid of dissension or conspiracies. 8 Although 
communism was intended to create a classless society, Stalin 
established an upper class. Referred to as the "nomenklatura" elite, 
Stalin surrounded himself with absolutely loyal subservients who 
7Schnitzer. Martin C. Comparative Economic Systems. Cincinnati, OH: South­
Western Publishing Co .. 1994. P. 226. 
8The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Inc., 1994. P. 1008. 3 
were members of the bureaucracy and were extended many 
privileges, controls, and rewards.9 
In 1953, Stalin died, and many of his extreme policies died 
with him. Following Stalin as leader of the Soviet Union until 1964, 
Nikita Khrushchev attempted to decentralize responsibilities and 
revive agriculture. While the standard of living improved for most 
Russians, Khrushchev maintained Stalin's economic focus on producer 
goods and heavy industry. After Khrushchev was deposed as party 
leader, Leonid Brezhnev increased the standard of living even more 
as he brought more focus to agriculture. Although Brezhnev 
attempted to bring the economy's growth rate back up, the process of 
economic and social decay had begun and was simply getting 
worse. IO 
Although Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko followed 
Brezhnez for short periods, no significant economic changes were 
implemented and the economic decay in the Soviet Union seemed to 
accelerate. Soviet goods were low quality, the level of technology 
used in the Soviet Union was very low in comparison to the United 
States, and constant shortages plagued producers as well as 
consumers. Military production was the only industry which 
operated efficiently. This state of the art industry drained the 
empire of the finances and the best of the work force. I I By the 
l 9801s, it became obvious that "central planning was inefficient, and
9Schnitzer. Martin C. Comparative Economic Systems. Cincinnati. OH: South­
Western Publishing Co., 1994. P. 227. 
10Tucker, Robert C. Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia; From 
to Gorbachev. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987. P. 108-139. 
1 Tucker, Robert C. Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia; From 
Lenin to Gorbachev. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987. P. 127-13�. 
the rejection of market prices, wages, and interest rates as indicators 
of scarcity resulted in production unrelated to needs of consumers." 1 2 
The Soviet government did not believe in the principles of free­
market economics and the respective theories on market 
equilibrium. This resulted in under-paid workers, over-priced 
supplies and stagnation throughout the economy .1 3 
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev replaced Chernenko with 
intentions to revitalize the Soviet economy. Gorbachev's leadership 
marked a restructuring era for economic policy in the Soviet Union. 
In particular, Gorbachev referred to his restructuring policies as 
"perestroika". Under Gorbachev, "perestroika" represented an 
attempt to modernize Soviet society, which meant less bureaucracy, 
central planning, and coercion in the economic field. In addition, his 
policy called for more reliance on private initiative and incentive, 
which in turn was supposed to rekindle the spirit of the masses.1 4 
There were three major principles of •perestroika", including 
tighter economic discipline, industrial modernization and economic 
reform. is In 1987, these principles were represented in a number of 
reforms in the Law on State Enterprises. For example, certain prices 
became negotiable, suppliers and customers could engage in 
contracts, workers were allowed to elect managers, collective farms 
could engage in private selling and buying, and joint venture 
12Schnitzer, Martin C. Ouaparal,ye Hgupmtc S:,altJQ1- Cincinnati, OH: South­
Western Publishing Co., 1994. P. 11. 
13Sclmitzer, Martin C. Comparative Economic Systems. Cincinnati, OH: South­
Western Publishing Co., 1994. P. 11. 
14Laquer, Walter. Ibe Loni: Road to Freedom; Russia and Glasnost. New York,
NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989. P. 52. 
15Schnitzer, Martin C. Comparatjye Economh, SX&1GJ11s. Cincinnati, OH: South-
Western Publishing Co., 1994. P. 230. 5 
legislation was passed to attract foreign capital. At the same time, 
Gorbachev implemented his policy of Glasnost, which meant 
openness about public affairs in every sphere of life.16 This openness 
went as far as exposing many of the bureaucratic inefficiencies, 
waste and mismanagement problems that plagued the communist 
economic system. Yet, economic reform was necessary, and glasnost 
was the tool used to inform Russians of the faults of their system, 
economically, politically, and socially. Although Gorbachev 
attempted to keep the Soviet Union unified, many republics took 
openness to mean freedom; and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia 
declared their independence in December 1991. 
While Gorbachev started the drastic reforms in the Soviet 
Union, which resulted in economic, political and cultural change, Boris 
Yeltsin, Gorbachev's successor, focused on continued economic 
reforms in hopes of keeping the Russian economy from slowing, or 
possibly reaching negative growth rates. For example, under 
Yeltsin's leadership, Russia adopted a value-added tax, made the 
ruble convertible to other currencies, eliminated state-administered 
prices, and worked to establish an investment banking system. 
Yeltsin claimed that his objective was to convert Russia into a market 
economy; and floating prices, an exchangeable ruble, and a 
intermediary system for capital investment were necessary to start 
the process of change. 17 Entrepeneurship and unemployment, signs 
of capitalism, resulted as Russians experienced a new privatized 
16Schnitzer, Martin C. Comparative Economic Systems. Cincinnati, OH: South�
Western Publishing Co., 1994. P. 232, 
17Schnitzer, Martin C. Comparative Economic Systems. Cincinnati, OH: South-
Western Publishing Co., 1994. P. 240. 6 
society where prices were no longer fixed and jobs were no longer 
guaranteed. 
By 1995, Russia's government had embraced the concept of a 
free-mark et system whole-heartily. Reforms were aimed at a 
transformation to capitalism, and there was no going back. 
According to Viktor Chemomyrdin, Russia's Prime Minister at the 
time, "The reform in Russia is irreversible ... We will never turn back 
from the course we have taken. "18 Although these reforms were 
supposed to improve the Russian economy in  the long run, the 
citizens of Russia felt the pain of the short run change and attempted 
to modify their behaviors in the midst of major transformation. Jick 
has described this type of environment, 
"By all accounts- cultural, political, social, and economic - the 
Russian Republic represents a country in transition ... there is 
considerable transformational change, where the magnitude of 
change represents a total abandonment of traditional 
behavior, expectations, and theories."19 
This economic reform created some form of change in every 
Russians' life; whether it be in their occupation, in their children's 
schooling, or their family's consumption patterns. 
From a business perspective, the change has been even more 
drastic and rapid. While the living standard is the same, business 
policy and economic values have changed 180 degrees. Clinton 
Longenecker, a business professor studying Russian managers, 
describes the situation: "Amidst these radical changes, managers, 
1 &warren, Marcus. '11Confusion' in Kremlin over reform program". The Daily 
Telegraph. January 31, 1994. P. 8. 
19Kaufmann, Patrick J.; Welsh, Dianne H.B.; Bushmarin, Nicholas V. "Locus of 
control and entrepreneurship in the Russian Republic". Entrepreneurship: 
Theory and Practice. September, 1995. P. 43. 7 
executives, and administrators find themselves in a new world for 
which they are ill-prepared given their past economic orientation, 
philosophies, and practices. "20 Yet, many Russians have excelled
throughout this period of change as they embraced the new system 
and emerged as leaders. 
Understanding the transition to capitalism and grasping the 
related business practices is essential to succeed in the Russia of 
today, one whose economy is now considered "free-market". Russia 
now has about 2,500 licensed commercial banks, 600 investment 
funds, and 40 million shareholders of publicly owned companies. 
Furthermore, Russia now has over 350,000 private farmers. These 
developments are not surprising as Russia contains immense natural 
wealth in the form of oil, gas, precious metals and diamonds, as well 
as strong humans resources: a universally literate work force and an 
abundance of scientists and engineers.21 "Russian capitalism is 
definitely taking hold. "22 And with it, there is a new style of Russian 
leadership taking hold. 
Th.e_J1-rob lern 
Leadership in Russia is under the influence of the economic 
transformation occurring. The environment in Russia is changing as 
the government attempts to recreate Russia under a new economic 
system. This new environment can be conceptualized as a macro 
situational factor affecting the nature of leader-follower relationships 
20Longenecker, Clinton 0. and Popovski. Sergei. "Managerial trials of
privatization: retooling Russian managers". Business Horizons. November, 
1994. P. 35. 
21 "A silent revolution". The Economist. April 8, 1995. 
22Galuszka, Peter and Kranz, Patricia. "Russia's New Capitalism".
�- October 10, 1994. P. 80. 
Business 
8 
and ways in which leaders and followers accomplish their goals. 
Therefore, the theories most relevant to understanding the 
leadership in Russia appear to be contingency theories, as they 
attempt to understand leadership in light of the situation. From an 
economic perspective, Russia bas experienced two economic systems, 
or "situations", in the past eighty years. Therefore, any study of 
leadership in Russia during this period must explicitly analyze the 
effects of these two economic "situations" on leadership. processes. 
The situational school of thought in leadership studies has 
provided many traditional contingency models of leadership which 
incorporate analysis of the situation. These theorists design 
contingency models because they propose that the emergence or 
effectiveness of any one leadership style or behavior is contingent 
upon aspects of the environment such as characteristics of followers, 
the task, and the immediate setting in which the leader is operating. 
Emory S. Bogardus discusses this phenomenon from a social 
perspective, "Social situations are not static. They are ever changing; 
the idea of process is implicit. Social situations call now for one set of 
leadership qualities but tomorrow perhaps for another set of 
traits. "23 
Some situational theories concentrate on the effectiveness of 
particular leadership styles in certain situations; others focus on 
aspects of the situation which enhance or nullify the effectiveness of 
certain leadership behaviors. Regardless of the theory. these models 
of leadership consider the situation, the social and physical 
23Reed, Harold W. The D.ynamics of LEADERSHIP. Danville, IL: The Interstate
Printers & Publishers, Inc., 1982. P. 93. 9 
environment, as well as the task and followers, to be major factors in 
determining which leadership behaviors are most effective. 
Although contingency theories attempt to define effective leadership 
under the constraint of different situational determinants, no one 
theory addresses the economic environment as a situational factor 
influencing the appropriateness of particular leadership styles or 
behaviors. An overview of the major contingency theories of 
leadership is provided to illustrate the limits of many of these 
theories in analyzing the impact of the economic reforms on 
leadership behavior in Russia. 
Qvernew of Contin&ena . Ibeori.cl of Lead�eablp 
There are certain contingency theories of leadership which 
have received considerable attention by leadership, management, 
and psychology scholars. For example, Gary A. Yuki's Leadership in 
Q:tpnizations. Second and Third editions, both contained a chapter on 
"Situational theories of effective leader behavior", which reviewed 
various situational theories, including "The Path-Goal Theory of 
Leadership", "Hersey and Blanchard's Situational Leadership Theory", 
and "Vroom and Yetton Normative ModeJ".24 A professor at State 
University of New York at Albany, Yuki's books focus on managerial 
leadership in organizations and present a broad survey of leadership 
theories in f onnal organizations. Therefore. bis focus is similar to 
that of this case study which looks into leadership of domestic 
business organizations. 
24Yukl, Gary A. Leadgsblp in Oraanizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall, Inc.. 1989 & 1994. t o
Peter B. Smith and Mark F. Peterson, in their book, Leadership, 
Or1anization and Culture. also provide a broad survey of leadership 
thought. They review leadership from the perspective of event 
management. The first part of this text provides an overview of the 
"evolving concept of leadership", while the second analyzes 
"leadership in its cultural and organizational context. "25 Providing
much information on Fiedler and his contingency theory, this book 
reviewed many of the same theories considered in Yuki's chapter on 
situational leadership. These theories include Osborne and Hunts 
Theory on Situational Determinants26 , Fiedler's LPC model27, Hersey 
and Blanchard's situational model of leadership2B, and Vroom and
Yetton's normative decision modeJ29. These theories are based on 
studies of superior-subordinate relations in business organizations 
and the military. Therefore, these contingency theories are relevant 
as the researcher considers domestic business organization 
leadership in Russia during the communist and capitalist eras. 
Although these are not the only valuable contingency theories of 
leadership, they are some of the most often cited contingency 
theories in leadership books and studies; and they are based on 
research in business organizations and the military. 
25 Smith, Peter B. and Peterson, Mark F. J ,afl4«•hja, Pr&ulatfe15* ud 
Culture. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1988. 
26Yukl, Gary. Leadership in Qc13nizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1994. P. 35. 
27 Smith, Peter B. and Peterson, Mark F. L:oe49rship, Orggizations, and 
Culture. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1988. P. 19. 
28Smith, Peter B. and Peterson, Mark F. Leadership. Organizations. and
Culture. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1988. P. 19. 
29Yukl, Gary. LeadershiJ.l in Qraanlzations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1994. P. 35 t 1 
In 1975, Osborne and Hunt researched the effects of certain 
situational determinants on leadership behavior. They proposed that 
macro level situational variables have substantial influence on 
managerial activity patterns and behavior content. These variables 
include crisis situations, the stage in the organizational life cycle, the 
function of the organizational unit, the size of the organizational unit, 
lateral interdependence and the level of management.30 Osborne 
and Hunt found that each of these variables had an influence on 
leadership style. For example, when a manager has a large number 
of subordinates, he/she used less participative styles of leadership. 
Furthermore, in a crisis situation, subordinates expected the leader to 
be "more assertive, directive, and decisive. "31 
Although Osborne and Hunt do not directly consider the 
economic system as a determinant, the situational determinant they 
considered which may indirectly incorporate the influence of the 
economic system is the organizational life cycle. One could argue that 
the implementation of a new economic system would place 
organizations in the initial stage of evolution. In this initial stage of 
organizational evolution, the primary role of the leader is to provide 
a vision for the organization and inspire commitment among 
followers. Unfortunately, Osborne and Hunt do not explicitly include 
the economic system in their research as a situational determinant. 
As this paper postulates, the economic system is a relevant 
30Yukl, Gary. L,adtrshh1 in Ou!ui �a.lions. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1994. P. 35. 
3 l Yuki, Gary. L�,uha:sbi12 in Q1s:aoiH1i2n11. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1994. P. 40. 12 
situational determinant, which influences leadership behavior, 
regardless of, but not independent of other situational determinants. 
Providing a more comprehensive perspective, Fiedler's LPC 
(least preferred coworker) contingency model of leadership 
addresses the influence of the situation and leader traits on leader 
effectiveness. Fiedler considers three aspects of the situation which 
influence "situational favorability:" leader-member relations, position 
power, and task structure. Fiedler postulates that the relationship 
between leader LPC score and effectiveness depends on situational 
favorability. A "task-oriented" leader would have a low LPC score, 
whereas a "relationship-oriented" leader would have a high LPC 
score. Therefore, according to the three aspects of the situation, a 
certain type of leader will be most effective. For example, when 
dealing with a structured task with good leader-member relations 
and having strong positional power, Fielder proposes that a leader 
with a low LPC would be most effective.32 Although Fielder 
considers each possible combination of the favorability factors, his 
theory is limited to those three situational determinants. While the 
economic system may impact task structure or leader-member 
relations, Fielder's theory, like most contingency theories, fails to 
take into account the influence of the economic system in which 
leader-member relations are embedded. 
One of the major criticisms of Fiedler's theory is the possible 
interdependence of the three "independent" situational variables.3 3 
32smith, Peter B. and Peterson, Mark F. Leadership, Qcganizations, and
Culture. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1988. P. 19. 
33Yukl, Gary. Leadership in Qreanizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1994. P. 284. 1 3 
In contrast, the path-goal theory of leadership treats the 
subordinates, the task, and the situation as interdependent variables. 
This theory of leadership postulates that the leader should diagnose 
the task environment and select the appropriate behaviors which 
will result in satisfied followers who are motivated toward 
organizational goals. In contrast to Fielder's LPC model, this 
approach focuses on four possible leader behaviors which are 
appropriate in different situations. The leader behaviors include 
supportive leadership, directive leadership, participative leadership, 
and achievement oriented leadership. House and Mitchell claimed 
that one of these behaviors would be most effective in any situation, 
depending on the situational moderator variables. 
According to path-goal theory. situational moderator variables 
incorporate characteristics of the task, the environment, and the 
followers. 34 These influencing factors are similar to Fielder's 
situational favorability factors. This theory, like Fielder's, also fails 
to directly consider the impact of the economic system on the 
situation. Yet, House and Mitchell would expect the leader to 
diagnose the environment, which includes "the nature of the work 
group, the authority system within the organization and the nature 
of each subordinate's tasks. "35 Therefore, a diagnosis would most 
likely entail an understanding of the economic system. Although one 
could consider the economic system to be a characteristic of the 
34Yukl, Gary. Leadership in Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Inc., 1994. P. 286. 
35smith, Peter B. and Peterson, Mark F. 
Culture. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1988. Pg. 21. 14 
environment, this 1s not explicitly considered in that manner by 
them. 
Hersey and Blanchard also provide a situational model of 
leadership which has been applied widely by practitioners.36 While 
for the most part, their theory has been used in management 
training, it directly applies to the study of domestic organizational 
leadership. Hersey and Blanchard's model rests on the following 
basic assumptions: 
1) There is no single all-purpose leadership style. What is
appropriate in each case depends on the follower (or
subordinate) and the task to be performed.
2) The leader's behavior has two independent main
components: directive behavior and supportive behavior.37
This model focuses on follower maturity, the situational moderator 
variable, as the situational determinant. Depending on the follower's 
maturity in dealing with a certain task, the leader should choose an 
appropriate behavior. These behaviors include directive behaviors, 
directing and coaching, and supportive behaviors, supporting and 
delegating. Different styles may be appropriate with the same 
follower when he/she is performing different tasks. Therefore, an 
effective leader understands which style would be most effective in 
a given situation depending on the follower(s)' maturity level. Like 
most situational theories, this model attempts to take into account 
the formal power of the leader in the situation. Unfortunately, 
36smith, Peter B. and Peterson, Mark F. 
Culture, Beverly HiUs, CA: SAGE Publications, 1988. Pg. 23. 
37Irgens, 0. M. "Situational leadership: A modification of Hersey and 
Blanchard's Model". Leadership and Organizational Development Journal.
1995. P. 1. 15 
Hersey and Blanchard only consider the follower's maturity and the 
task as aspects of the situation. Their theory does not and can not 
incorporate an economic system as a situational variable. 
The Vroom and Yetton normative decision model is another 
form of contingency theory.38 Yet, this model focuses on the decision 
procedures which are appropriate for certain situations. These 
theorists specify which decision procedures are effective in specific 
situations. Vroom and Yetton lay out five decision procedures for 
decisions involving multiple subordinates. Of the five, two 
procedures involve autocratic decision making, two procedures 
involve consultation decision making, and one procedure involves 
joint decision making by the leader and the subordinates. According 
to this model, there are seven variables in the situation which 
determine which decision making procedure is most effective. These 
seven variables include: 
1) amount of relevant information possessed by leader and
subordinates,
2) likelihood that subordinates will accept an autocratic
decision,
3) compatibility of leader and subordinate objectives,
4) importance of decision quality,
5) importance of decision acceptance,
6) amount of disagreement among subordinates with respect to
preferred alternatives,
7) extent to which the decision problem is unstructured.3 9
38Smith, Peter B. and Peterson, Mark F. Leaderabi12, Pt1anizations, and
Culture. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1988. P. 23. 
39Yukl, Gary. Leadership in Or1apizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1994. P. 164. 1 6 
According to the Vroom and Yetton decision process flowchart, 
a leader can determine which decision making process would be 
most effective in any particular situation. Like Fiedler1s model, this 
model has been supported by extensive research (Vroom & Jago, 
1988). Again, similar to Fiedler's model and the path-goal model, 
this model does not directly address the impact of the economic 
system on leadership style. Vroom and Yetton concentrate on the 
leader, the subordinates, and their micro level relationship. This 
model seems to lack the capacity needed to address the macro level 
influence of an economic system. 
Although three of the contingency models discussed above 
(Vroom and Yetton, Fielder and Hersey and Blanchard) could 
indirectly incorporate the economic system as an influencing aspect 
of the leadership situation via other determinants, to extrapolate 
how these models might view economic systems as a situational 
variable affecting leadership behavior would be problematic since 
the theorists were not considering factors at the macro level. Yet, 
there is a contingency theory which does address the influence of 
economics on effectiveness of leadership styles. In The Dynamics of 
LEADERSHIP, Harold W. Reed lays out his version of situational 
leadership. According to Reed, this book "is a practical disclosure of 
all elements and wisdom of one acknowledged leader's view of 
leadership, paired with scores of examples of other world class 
leaders" .40 Reed attempts to provide a complete collection of 
definitions and explanations of leadership, as well as many 
40Reed, Harold W. The Dynamics of LEADERSHIP. Danville, IL: The Interstate
Printers & Publishers, Inc., 1982. 1 7 
illustrations of them. This source included the "situationist theory" 
which is not covered in any of the other sources reviewed. 
Reed considers many forces which make up the environment or 
situation in which the leader must interact. He claims, "the 
environmental forces of social, cultural, historic, economic, political, 
religious and scientific factors unite to determine the direction to 
which the social change is oriented. "41 Reed calls his theory a "social
situationist" theory of leadership. 
Reed postulates that social aspects of the situation create an 
environment conducive to certain styles of leadership. He writes, 
"For the situationist, leadership is molded and 
determined by the situation ... For instance, he [/she] may 
choose between three or more different style of 
leadership in attempt to find the most acceptable style 
possible to reach his [/her] objective or objectives at a
given time."42 
Reed believes that economic factors represent a powerful force in the 
creation of a social situation. Reed explains, "While leadership 
encompasses the full-orbed and creative style which goes far beyond 
mere routine, the social situation in any study ... must include 
measurements of economics as a force."43 Although Reed is one of 
the few to consider economic factors, he also gives equal 
consideration to political, socio-cultural, technical, scientific, 
educational, religious, and legal forces and institutions. While 
considering each of these factors, Reed explains the next step, .. In 
41Reed, Harold W. The Dynamics of LEADERSHIP.
Printers & Publishers, Inc., 1982. P. 95. 
42Reed, Harold W. TIM; Qremlsa pf Jsl#tQB&fflfP.
Printers & Publishers, Inc., 1982. P. 96. 
43Reed, Harold W. Ib, Dn;uui1;;a gf l,EADERSHIP.
Printers & Publishers, Inc., 1982. P. 97. 
Danville, IL: The Interstate 
Danville, IL: The Interstate 
Danville, IL: The Interstate 
18 
situational analysis the objective is to identify each key factor in the 
situation by evaluating the dimensions of the factor. Once the 
situation is mapped out, the question becomes that of the course of 
actions or leadership style that will be effective. "4 4
Although Reed•s situationist theory is valuable in its 
consideration of economic forces, its focus is obtuse, encompassing all 
aspects of the situation. While no one can disregard the influence of 
all the factors laid out by Reed, this paper focuses on the influence of 
the economic system on leadership behavior. In this report, the 
economic situation is considered one of the most powerful aspects of 
the situation because it deeply influences many aspects of 
organizations, individuals, and their respective day-to-day activities. 
Contingency theories fail to consider the influence of an 
economic system on leadership, followership, and the environment 
because the economic system is a macro-variable and theorist are 
concerned with micro-variables in organizations; or because the 
economic system may be experienced in organizations via its effects 
on other variables. From Fielder, who address principally micro level 
factors, to Reed, who address many macro level factors, traditional 
situational or contingency theories have not directly explored the 
influence of economic factors on leadership behavior. Therefore, the 
goal of this paper is to examine the influence of economic systems on 
"effective" leadership styles or behaviors. 
The Present Study 
44Reed, Harold W. The Dynamics of LEADERSHIP. Danville, IL: The Interstate
Printers & Publishers, Inc., 1982. P. 99. 19 
Using leadership in the former Soviet Union as a case study, 
this paper details the different leadership styles used by domestic 
leaders in Russia during the communist period. as well as, during the 
initial stages of Russia as a capitalist, free-market economy. Using 
insights based on the situational leadership theories outlined in the 
previous section. this paper will examine the different leadership 
styles which were most "effective" under each system. ( For the 
purpose of this study, the term "effective" will be defined as follows: 
"A general consensus from both the research and practitioner 
literature appears to be that effective managers elicit high 
performance productivity and quality from their units and 
satisfaction and organizational loyalty from their 
subordinates. 114 5
This definition corresponds to this report's focus on domestic 
organizational leadership.) The analysis will shed light on whether 
leadership in Russia during the different time periods was 
"relationship-oriented" or "task-oriented". two basic dimensions of 
leadership behavior that are fundamental elements of most 
contemporary leadership theories (and, in particular, contingency 
theories). The final section of the paper suggests a hybrid of a 
contingency theory which incorporates economic factors as 
situational determinants of leadership effectiveness. and may be 
useful in stimulating future research in this area. 
Methodology 
Using Russia as a case study, the purpose of this report is to 
compare and contrast a set of leadership behaviors which were 
45Luthans, Fred; Welsh, Dianne H. B.; Rosenkrantz, Stuart A. "What do
managers really do? An observational study with comparisons to U.S. 
managers". Journal of International Business. December 22, 1993. 20 
considered to be "effective" under a communist economic system as 
compared to a capitalist economic system. According to Robert K. 
Yin, author of Case Study Research; Designs and methods. a case 
study "investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are 
used. "46 In this report, leadership is the phenomenon being studied; 
and, the economic situation in Russia is a major aspect of the context. 
Finally, multiple sources of evidence are considered in trying to 
analyze the relationship between economic situation and leadership 
in Russiai 
Gathering multiple source of evidence on domestic leadership 
m Russia during the Soviet era is difficult due to the government's 
control of information. Literature written before the fall of Soviet 
rule was highly subjective and highly influenced by the government. 
Furthermore, published studies of Soviet leadership were limited to 
high-ranking political officers. Yet, some documents have been 
uncovered which describe "effective" Soviet managers and directors. 
A few studies regarding specific factories, like Vlachoutisicos 
and Lawrence's Behind Factory Walls. were conducted during the 
communist era by international scholars, who provide a more 
objective description of management under communism than that 
available from official government sources.47 Moreover, since 
perestroika. or the opening of Russia, many scholars have studied 
46Yin, Robert K. Ca,se Study Researcb · Desi llDS and Methods. Newbury Park,
CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1989. P. 23. 
47Behind the Factory Walls. Edited by Paul R. Lawrence and Charalambos A.
Vlachoutsicos. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1990. 2 1 
management in Soviet Russia utilizing retrospective analysis 
methods. Thus. because few studies are available describing 
leadership during communism, and those released by the Soviet 
government are highly questionable in validity, the majority of 
information examined in the present study was produced during and 
after Gorbachev's perestroika was implemented. Since perestroika 
was implemented, scholars from around the world have studied all 
aspects of Russian business management. Furthermore, "since the 
demise of the Soviet Union, much attention in the popular press has 
focused on the dramatic challenges facing managers of enterprises in 
the emerging Russian Republic".48 A number of these recent articles 
provide historical analysis of leadership in Russia in the years 
preceding perestroika. 
Information regarding leadership in Russia under capitalism is 
more readily available. From the The Moscow Times to The Reuter 
tiw:HMD Business Report, periodicals have increased their coverage 
of all aspects of Russia and its history. In particular, studies about 
Russian management and leadership are now available. Many 
management, sociology, and psychology journals have published 
articles on management in Russia. present and past. For example, 
IQdgtdaJ M11a112mont. Ipmnat of International Business Studies. 
Dvlaeu Horizona,, Han:vd Badness Review and Entrepreneurship; 
Theory and Practice have published research on leadership in Russia, 
leadership in the Soviet Union and corresponding changes that have 
occurred in leadership over the past ten years. For example, Paul 
48Luthans, Fred; Welsh, Dianne H. B.; Rosenkrantz, Stuart A. 11What do Russian 
managers really do? Ao observational study with comparisons to U.S. 
managers". Journal of International Business Studies. 22 Dec., 1993. 22 
Lawrence and Charalambos Vlachoutsicos have studied Russian 
management extensively under communism and capitalism. Thus, 
while the data sources for this study are not ideal, it is hoped that 
the use of multiple sources of evidence will allow this researcher to 
conduct a case study in which conclusions are persuasive and valid 
because they are "based on several different sources of 
information. "49 
The evidence that is gathered will be analyzed in terms of 
situational theories of leadership, and, in particular, Hersey and 
Blanchard's situational leadership theory .so This approach is being 
taken since it represents the general "preferred" analytic strategy for 
conducting case studies. As Yin observes: 
"The first and more preferred strategy [for conducting a case 
study] is to follow the theoretical propositions that led to the 
case study. The original objectives and design of the case 
study presumably were based on such propositions, which in 
turn reflected a set of research questions, reviews of 
literature, and new insights."51 
Considered in terms of the data gathered about leadership in 
Russia throughout this study, Hersey and Blanchard's "situational 
leadership theory" attempts to explain effective leadership in terms 
of the moderating effect of one situational moderator variable on two 
broadly defined leader behaviors," directive, task-oriented 
leadership behaviors and supportive, relationship-oriented 
49Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research; Designs and Methods. Newbury Park,
CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1989. P. 97. 50Yukl, Gary. Leadership in OrKJnizatfons. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hal1,
Inc., 1989. P. 104. 
51 Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research; Designs and Methods. Newbury Park,
CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1989. P. 106. 2 3 
leadership behaviors.52 Yuki summarizes Hersey and Blanchard's 
definitions of these forms of leadership style. He suggests, task 
oriented behavior "is the extent to which a leader organizes and 
defines the role of followers by explaining what each person must do, 
when, where, and how tasks are to be accomplished. "53 These 
leaders initiate structure and set high performance goals for their 
subordinates. In contrast relationship oriented behavior "is the 
extent to which a leader maintains personal relationships with 
followers by opening up channels of communication, providing 
socioemotional support, and giving 'psychological strokes"' .s 4 
Hersey and Blanchard postulate that the level of subordinate 
maturity determines the optimal leadership behavior. 
•·Follower maturity includes two related components: (1) job
maturity is a subordinate's task-relevant skills and technical
knowledge, and (2) psychological maturity is the subordinate's
self-confidence ad self-respect."55
Follower maturity (the situational moderator variable) is usually 
assessed in relation to a particular task performed by the 
subordinate. Hersey and Blanchard maintain that: 
"as subordinate maturity increases from the minimum 
amount up to a moderate level. the leader should use more 
relations behavior and less task behavior. As subordinate 
maturity increases beyond a moderate level, the leader should 
52Yukl, Gary. Leadership in On:anlzations. 
Inc., 1989. P. 104.
53Yukl, Gary. Leadenhip in oc,anizations. 
Inc., 1989. P. 104.
54Yukl, Gary. Leadership in Or11nizations. 
Inc., 1989. P. 104.
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Inc., 1989. P. 105.
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decrease the amounts of relations behavior while continuing 
to decrease the amount of task behavior. 0 5 6 
In relation to this case study, this situational leadership theory 
is being used as a template for analysis of leadership in Russia for 
several reasons. First, Hersey and Blanchard's theory is based on 
leadership within business organizations, which is the focus of this 
study as well. In addition, much of the evidence collected reviews 
managerial. or domestic leader, behavior before and after the fall of 
communism in the Soviet Union. Second, its basic theoretical 
constructs are logically amenable to adaptation from a micro to a 
macro level of analysis. For example, it seems reasonable to move 
from a micro-level analysis of follower maturity at the task level to a 
macro-level analysis of followers' knowledge and psychological 
readiness to perform roles within an economic system. Thus, one 
might hypothesize that the maturity levels of followers m the Soviet 
Union was high under the communist economic system as they 
generally understood (although not necessarily liked) their roles as 
contributors to the state. In contrast. their maturity level might be 
considered low, although increasing, under the new capitalist system, 
in which they have minimal experience. In sum, using an adapted 
version (macro-level) of Hersey and Blanchard's model as a 
theoretical template for analysis. this paper offers a case study 
analysis of "effective" leadership behavior in the communist Soviet 
Union and the free-market oriented Russia. In the section that 
follows, the database reviewed as a source for conducting the 
56Yukl. Gary. Leadership in Orianizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1989. P. 105. 25 
analysis of Soviet and Russian leadership in light of Hersey and 
Blanchard's "situational theory of leadership" is described. 
Database for Case Study 
In order to construct a case describing leadership 
"effectiveness" in Russia, a corpus of "data" about Russia, its history, 
economic system, etc. was required. Several general sources 
provided a history of Russia and its economic system for the case 
study. For example, The New Encyclopaedia Britannica was used to 
provide a history of the Soviet Union.57 The historical information 
found in this source was used to introduce the case study and 
allowed the researcher to obtain a detailed account of the rise and 
fall of the Soviet Union. 
Comparative Economic Systems. by Martin C. Schnitzer, 
provided both historical and economic information regarding the 
Soviet Union and Russia.58 This book was a valuable source because 
it discussed the fundamentals of capitalism, socialism, and Marxist 
communism. Furthermore, Schnitzer addressed the Soviet Union in 
particular, as an example of the collapse of communism. This source 
included detailed accounts of the environments created by the 
different economic systems that have existed in Russia. 
Alfred G. Meyer's, Communism, an in-depth look at 
communism and its evolution from the writings of Marx to the 
government of the Soviet Union, was useful for its analysis of the 
57The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. Chicago. n.: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Inc., 1994. P. 995-1022. 
58Schnitzer, Martin C. Comparative Economic Systems. Cincinnati, OH: South­
Western Publishing Co., 1994. 2 6 
communist economic system.59 This source provided a perspective 
of the Soviet Union as a communist system. describing the resulting 
institutions, their respective roles, and their effects on the Soviet 
Union. Robert C. Tucker's Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet 
Russia, was also helpful in that this work focused on the impact of 
communism on culture and leadership in Soviet Russia. 60 This 
historical analysis covers communist political leaders, from Lenin to 
Gorbachev, detailing their respective roles in the evolution of 
communism in the Soviet Union. Finally, Walter Laquer's, Dw LMI 
Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost. covers the later stages of the 
evolution of communism, focusing on its umaveling in the Soviet 
Union.61 He addresses the impact of Gorbachev's social policies on 
the people and organizations of Russia. Though sparingly used, each 
of these three sources contributed to the researcher's understanding 
of communism in the Soviet Union, from Marx's ideology to 
Gorbachev's changes. 
Many articles and studies also provided general information on 
the Soviet Union, the collapse of communism, and Russia under a new 
economic system. Many of these articles produced specific 
information about leadership under the communist system and the 
capitalist system. For example, a 1994 article from Business Week. 
"Russia's New Capitalism", outlined successful enterprises in four 
major Russian industries, including manufacturing, banking, services, 
59Meyer, Alfred G. Communism, New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 1967.
60Tucker, Robert C. Political Culture and LeadersbiD lg So1iet Russia; from
Lenin to Gorbachev. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987. 
61Laquer, Walter. The Lou& Road to freedom; Russia and Glasnost. New York, 
NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989. 2 7 
and technology. 62 Describing certain leaders and their enterprises in 
new economic system, this article detailed a few attributes common 
in the new types of leaders in Russia. "So Sue Me", an article in 
Forbes about corruption in the Russian market place, also provided 
information regarding leadership characteristics emerging in Russia 
under capitalism in the early 1990•s.63 This source concentrated on 
the business aspects of leadership in Russia. Another business 
source article, 11 'Confusion' in the Kremlin Over Reform Program", 
which was published in the Daily Tele1raph, explained how the 
Russian government was committed to economic reform. 64 
A series of articles appearing in The Economist provided useful 
information about Russia's emerging markets in the l 9901s, including 
"A Silent Revolution''. "The Sale of the Century", "Restructure or Die", 
"Putting Russia Right". and "Das Kapital Revisited" .65 In addition, 
these articles provided information about Russian markets, 
privatization, management, and certain industries, as well as a few 
examples of leadership. Some of these articles also considered the 
focus on the micro-changes in Russian economics, finance, and 
business administration, _like selling stock to employees and 
restructuring the management system. "It's like climbing the 
Himalayas", an article in Business Week served the same purpose as 
62Galuszka, Peter and Kranz, Patricia. "Russia's New Capitalism". Business
�- October 10, 1994. 
63Klebnikov, Paul and Linden, Dana Wechsler. "So Sue Me". Forbes. August 1,
1994. P. 91. 
64Warren, Marcus. "'Confusion' in Kremlin over reform program.". DI Dally 
Telerraph. January 31, 1994. P. 8. 
65 "Survey: Russia's Emerging Market". The Economist. April 8, 1995. 28 
many of the works noted above. 66 However, this article also 
described one man's effort to save a decrepit tractor factory. In 
particular, this article described the business activities of Joseph 
Abramovich Bak:aleynik, who restructured his organization and 
increased the stock value of his firm. 
Data was also assessed from articles which provided 
information about leader/manager/director behaviors in Russia and 
the outcomes of their actions. Many articles were reviewed which 
did focus on specific leadership styles and traits in Russia. For 
example, "Locus of control and entrepeneurship in the Russian 
Republic", by Kauffmann, Welsh and Bushmarin, was a study of the 
locus of control of Russian entrepreneurs under the capitalist 
system.67 This study also compared Russian business leaders to U.S. 
business leaders. Using roughly 300 Russian entrepreneurs who 
were under 30 years old as their sample, these scholars measured 
the amount of control Russians believed they had over the events of 
their lives, powerful others, and chance. Interestingly, this study 
found that Russians did locate control of their lives internally, a 
significant finding considering the history of communist control in 
Russia.68 
In 1994, Business Horizons also provided an article which 
analyzed leadership behaviors in Russia under a capitalist economic 
66Galuszka. Peter. '"It's Like Climbing the Himalayas". Business Week. May 2.
1994. P. 106. 
67Kaufmann, Patrick J.; Welsh, Diane H. B.; and Bushmarin, Nicolas V. "Locus 
of control and entrepreneurship in the Russian Republic". Entrepeneurship: 
Theory and Practice. September. 1995. 
68Kaufmann, Patrick J.; Welsh, Diane H. B.; and Bushmarin, Nicolas V. "Locus
of control and entrepreneurship in the Russian Republic". 
Theory and Practice. September, 1995. 29 
system. Longenecker and Popovski's article, "Managerial Trails of 
Privatization: Retooling Russian Managers", described traits of 
managers in the communist Russia as well as capitalist Russia,69 
Using a sample of 159 managers and executives from more than 25 
organizations, they also attempted to lay out the problems Russian 
managers face in the new system and the skills needed to overcome 
them. Finally, these theorists laid out a process of retooling Russian 
managers for the free-market system. This 1994 article provided 
much information about the new styles of leadership in Russia and 
why they have emerged. 
"Managing Russian Factory Workers: the Impact of U.S.-Based 
Behavioral and Participative Techniques", by Welsh, Luthans, and 
Sommer described the use of U.S. management techniques and the 
effectiveness of them in Russia.70 In particular, this article covered 
the impact of providing extrinsic awards and the effectiveness of 
relations-oriented behavioral management in Russia. In the early 
l 99Os, data were gathered in the largest textile factory in Russia and
proved that these techniques had significant positive effects. 
Colin Silverstone also drew a comparison between U.S. and 
Russian managers. His study examined aspects of worker motivation 
in factories in the U.S. in comparison to the communist, state-owned 
factories in Russia. This study showed differences in worker 
motivation and leadership behaviors between the two countries. 
69Longenecker, Clinton 0. and Popovskl. Sergei. "Managerial trials of 
privatization: retooling Russian managers". Business Horizons. November, 
1994. 
70Welsh. Diane B.; Luthans, Fred; and Sommer. Steven M. "Managing Russian 
Factory Workers: the impact of U.S.-based behavioral and participative 
techniques". Academy of Management Journal. Vol. 36 1993. 30 
While the purpose of this study, conducted between June 1990 and 
July 1991, was to address multinational issues, it was primarily used 
in this case study for its commentary on Russian leadership behavior 
and worker motivation under the communist, state-owned system.7 1
Micheal Kublin, author of "The Soviet factory Director: A 
Window on Eastern Bloc Manufacturing," also wrote about leader 
behavior under cmnmunism.72 Although this article was published 
in 1990, it was based on the Soviet era. From the average education 
level of directors to the environment they worked in, this article 
focused on many aspects of management under the communist 
environment. Although this was not a behavioral study, Kublin did 
provide some information on common leadership behaviors used in 
the Soviet Union and offered examples of capitalist management to 
contrast with the Soviet Union. 
The study which provided the most information on communist 
domestic leadership was Diane Koenker's article, published in � 
,m Review. "Factory Tales: Narratives of Industrial Relations in 
the Transition to NEP". 73 This article presented narratives from 
workers of the Soviet Union in the 1930's, during the formative 
years of communism. Using information appearing as part of a 
newspaper contest in the Soviet Union. Koenker's study offered a 
third party analysis of effective leadership styles of directors under 
71 Silverthorne, Colin P. "Work Motivation in the United States, Russia and the 
Republic of China: A comparison". Journal of Applied Social Psycholoay .• 1992. 
P. 1637.
72Kublin, Micheal. "The Soviet Factory Director: a window on Eastern Bloc
manufacturing". Industrial Mana&ement. March, 1990.
73Koenker, Diane P. "Factory tales: narratives of industrial relations in the
transition to NEP". The Russian Review. July, 1996, P. 384-412. 3 1 
communism. She also provides information about the behaviors and 
leadership styles which were negatively regarded by subordinates. 
This source was considered relatively valid because the government 
would not have a reason to alter positive accounts of leadership. Yet, 
it is necessary to note that the Soviet government did control the 
information in the Soviet Union during this period. 
Charalambos Vlachoutsicos and Paul Lawrence's works also 
provided much information regarding effective leadership behaviors 
in the Soviet Union. In their article, "What We Don't Know About 
Soviet Management", these scholars highlight the positive 
characteristics of managers during communism and how they were 
effective within the systcm.74 In "Joint Ventures in Russia: Put the 
Locals in Charge'\ Lawrence and Vlachoutsicos examine the abilities 
of Soviet managers under the capitalist system.75 Both of these 
articles were extracted from their book, Wind Factoxy Walls. in 
which these authors compare management systems in the Soviet 
Union and the United States.76 This book also compared cultural 
characteristics, economic institutions, and decision making techniques 
of the two countries. 
Finally, in their article, "What do Russian Managers Really D01••, 
Luthans, Welsh and Rosenkrantz examined the day-to-day activities 
of Russian managers and contrasted them with managers in the 
74Vlachoutsicos, Charalambos and Lawrence, Paul. ,.What we don't know about
Soviet Management". Haryard Business Review. November-December, 1990. P. 
59. 
75Vlachoutsicos, Charalambos and Lawrence, Paul. "Joint Ventures in Russia: 
Put the locals in charge". Harvard Business Review. January-February. 1993. 
P. 44.
7 6Behind the Factm:y Walls. Edited by Paul R. Lawrence and Charalambos A.
Vlachoutslcos. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1990. 3 2 
United States.77 Although this study focused on managers under the 
new system and the activities in which they engage (e.g. networking, 
human resource management, and communication,) it also provided 
information on Russian managerial activity during its varying 
economic periods. 
The multiple sources of evidence reviewed provided coverage 
of domestic business leadership in the Soviet Union and Russia. 
Although each of these sources is not ideal, relevant information has 
been extrapolated in hopes of providing convincing data. In sum, in 
the pages that follow, information gathered from the sources ·are 
integrated into a brief case description of leadership under 
communism and more recently under the new capitalism. 
Leadership in the Communist and Capitalist Eras 
The Communist Era 
In the Soviet Union, the communist system dictated every 
aspect of Russian life, from management of industry and agriculture 
to the arts and education. "Communism's influence ranged deeply 
into every facet of society--including organizational life. "78 From 
work to play, Russians were dominated by "the Party 11 at all times. 
The communist party attempted to control Russian thought through 
propaganda, fear, and the communist ideology. While the Party used 
77Luthans, Fred; Welsh, Dianne H. B.; Rosenkrantz, Stuart A. "What do Russian 
managers really do? An observational study with comparisons to U.S. 
managers". Journal of International Business Studies. 22 Dec •• 1993. 
78Longenecker, Clinton 0. and Popovski, Sergei. "Managerial trials of 
privatization: retooling Russian managers". Business Horizons. November, 
1994. P. 35. 33 
fear to keep the system strong, it used God1s will as an excuse to 
suppress a majority of the population, the labor class. 79 The 
communist influence was felt at an early age; "all Soviet students, 
regardless of their major, have received massive doses of ideological 
and political indoctrination ... "80 11The Party" promised its citizens that 
communism was the system needed to create God's kingdom on earth 
and the happiness of mankind. "The attractiveness of communism as 
an ideology was based on the belief that it could create a society free 
from exploitation and want."81 Although the government was 
supposed to represent the opinion of the bourgeoisie, or the labor 
class, the members of the government were most concerned about 
maintaining their authority and control. 82 While every citizen was to 
contribute according to their ability and only take according to their 
needs, the government resulted in a system full of exploitation and 
waste. 
Leadership at a domestic level in Russia was strongly 
influenced by the control of the communist party. Within the 
factories and on the farms, the local leaders were products of "the 
system". "Like all managers, Russian managers [needed to] be 
effective leaders, communicators, planners and organizers. 
Interestingly, however, many traditional responsibilities of managers 
were controlled at the highest levels of the state-controlled 
79Schnitzer, Martin C. Comparative Economic Systems. Cincinnati, OH: South­
Western Publishing Co., 1994. P. 163. 
80Kublin, Micheal. "The Soviet Factory Director: a window on Eastern Bloc 
manufacturing". Industrial Management. March, 1990. 
81 Schnitzer, Martin C. Comparative Economic Systems. Cincinnati, OH: South­
Western Publishing Co., 1994. P. 163. 
82Schnitzer. Martin C. Comparative Economic Systems. Cincinnati, OH: South­
w estem Publishing Co., 1994. P. 164. 3 4 
organizations. "83 The environment created by government dictated 
the activities, behaviors, and attitudes of leaders in all organizations. 
While the system dictated basic principles of leadership in 
Russia, leaders differentiated themselves with their personalities and 
behaviors. Managers ran their factories differently although many of 
their activities were pre-determined by the state. Using different 
behavior styles and allocating time to different activities, managers 
were able to motivate workers to increase output and create 
different levels of subordinate satisfaction. Unfortunately, output 
levels were often subjective to the expectations of the state because 
managers would lie if they did not truly reach their set goals. 
Directors "had considerable opportunity for maneuverability and 
manipulation. What he could confidently claim to have accomplished 
was more important than what he actually did. "84 Therefore, one 
aspect of the measure of "effectiveness". high performance 
productivity, was subjective to state demand. 
In the Russian economy, shortages, absenteeism, alcoholism, 
and a lack of motivation became common in the workplace. From the 
inception of communism, a common theme of employees in Russian 
business was "the state pretends to pay us; we pretend to work."85 
11The traditional state-run system created a weak relationship 
between outcomes and performance. A manager could have 
83Longenecker, Clinton 0. and Popovski, Sergei. "Managerial trials of 
privatization: retooling Russian managers". Business Horizons. November, 
1994. Pg. 35. 
84Kublin, Micheal. "The Soviet Factory Director: a window on Eastern Bloc
manufacturing". Industrial Mana�ement. March, 1990. 
85Kublin, Micheal. "The Soviet Factory Director: a window on Eastern Bloc 
manufacturing". Industrial Management. March, 1990. 3 5 
complete disregard for quality and still receive promotion."86 Yet, 
many factories were considered successful for reasons other than 
high levels of production. 
Under the communist ideology, the ideal manager was often 
described as follows: 
The basic criterion for excellence was the manager's 
'khoziaistvennost', or managerial capability. This was the 
director's duty to the state: to raise production. But as a 
Communist he must also defend the interest of workers, and 
the best directors would find the proper equilibrium... The 
best director was an organizer, a helmsman, the head of 
enterprise, the brain of workers' class consciousness, and the 
soul of political life in the enterprise. "8 7 
Although the state wanted managers to balance the emphasis on 
production and subordinate satisfaction, career advancement had 
little to do with either factor. "Advancement [was] based upon 
managerial skill, luck, connections, and, most importantly, political 
reliability. 0 88 In contrast, from a subordinate's perspective, 
11effective" managers were more concerned about their employees 
than production and "the Party". While factory workers did not 
choose their leaders under the communist system, they often 
determined their "effectiveness11 with their effort, cooperation and 
satisfaction level. 
The situation Soviet directors faced also involved many aspects 
of the unfavorable environment which was developing in the Soviet 
86Longenecker, Clinton 0. and Popovski, Sergei. "Managerial trials of
privatization: retooling Russian managers". Business Horizons. November, 
1994. P. 35. 
87Koenker, Diane P. "Factory tales: narratives of industrial relations in the
transition to NEP". The Russian Review. July, 1996. Pg 384-412. 
88Kublin, Micheal. "The Soviet Factory Director: a window on Eastern Bloc
manufacturing". lpdustrial Management. March, 1990. 36 
Union. To simply get by as a leader, the director had to successfully 
overcome many of the shortfalls of the communist system. The 
Soviet economy was planned; specific production targets and input 
constraints were set for each sector of the economy. Labor 
productivity goals were also set. However, "For Soviet factory 
directors, the plan has been a double edged sword. If they could 
meet production targets their jobs were probably secure ... if they 
continually missed their quota, they were likely demoted." 89
Therefore, leaders often had to choose between lying about 
production, coercing the work force into meeting production 
standards, or failing to meet goals. Aside from dealing with 
production goals, Soviet leaders faced the problems associated with 
an unmotivated work force, out of date equipment and constant 
shortages. For example, "on any given day, 10% of the work force 
may [have been] absent. .. 90 Furthermore, the equipment supplied by 
the state did not enable leaders to be highly productive. For 
instance, one leader considered the production of his factory to be 
worth new equipment. "He said the plant produced one million 
rubles worth of engines every day and was so valuable to the 
enterprise as a whole that it would have to help the factory replace 
its 827 pieces of faulty equipment. "91 Unfortunately. the economic 
system could not afford to replace equipment in the later years of 
8 9Kublin, Micheal. "The Soviet Factory Director: a window on Eastern Bloc 
manufacturing". Industrial Manuement. March. 1990. 
90vtachoutsicos, Charalambos and Lawrence, Paul. "What we don't know about 
Soviet Management". Harvard Business Review. November•December, 1990. P. 
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communism and the Director could not realistically meet production 
goals. 
Surprisingly, "given the economic realities of peremptory 
centralized planning, state monopoly, and constant shortage, a 
remarkable number of Soviet enterprises produced usab]e, 
sophisticated products and cared for their workers as well. "92 The 
best leaders in the Soviet Union were able to accomplish this in light 
of the struggling market. For example, Avdeev, a Soviet factory 
director written about in a Pravda newspaper contest, was praised 
by his subordinates because he "'spared us from the 
market' ... negotiating with cooperatives for low prices or bypassing 
the market altogether. "93 Often leaders had to circumvent the 
bureaucracy of the state. 
From the perspective of subordinates. "effective" leaders 
circumvented the state. The best leaders put more energy into the 
workers' needs, and less time into production and "the Party". Yet, 
production was essential for the welfare of the workers because 
without adequate performance, these workers would find themselves 
underpaid, or possibly unemployed. Therefore, a leader who could 
balance the needs of the subordinates and the needs of the factory 
was ideal. 
One of the most commonly cited virtues of "effective" leaders in 
communist industry was the ability to revive, preserve and promote 
production. In fact, leaders were considered heroic if they had the 
92Luthans, Fred; Welsh, Dianne H. B.; Rosenkrantz, Stuart A. 11What do Russian 
managers really do? An observational study with comparisons to U.S. 
managers". Journal nf Jnternational Business Studies. 22 Dec., 1993. 
93Koenker, Diane P. "Factory tales: narratives of industrial relations in the 
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ability to tum a factory around. For example, N. A. Arkhangel'skii 
"created a living, alive factory from dead and sleeping people", 
according to one of his workers.94 (Directors names were provided by 
the Koenker article which reviewed a Pravda newspaper contest for 
the best manager in the Soviet Union.) And Osip Suchkov revived a 
factory where "our giant slept the sleep of the dead, and the workers 
were without shoes, without clothing, starving, they walked around 
like black phantoms. "95 The turning point in this factory occurred 
when Osip Suchkov told his subordinates, "It's life, or death. Save 
the factory, and you save yourselves."96 
Not all good directors resuscitated dead factories; many of them 
simply protected their factories from closure. For example, 11 Avdeev 
took over the Petrograd powder plant... when many factories were 
evacuated or closed down, but he kept his plant open ... and provided 
his workers with food."97 There were others like him. Vasilii 
Dmitrievich Serov restored production in his military factory, 
revived a supplier's repair shop, and organized a fire brigade. His 
subordinates considered his strength "inhuman". Sergei Grigorievich 
Rudnik took over a chemical factory with no materials, no fuel and 
no customers; and managed to keep his plant open and to secure his 
workers existence. Finally, a factory director named Anisimov was 
nominated in the Pravda contest for using every resource available, 
94Koenker, Diane P. •Factory tales: narratives of industrial relations
transition to NEP". The Russian Review. July, 1996. P 384-412. 
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keeping his factory alive and to keep his workers from being thrown 
out onto the streets. 9 8 
From repairing their existing factories to finding customers and 
money, "effective" leaders had the ability to keep a plant afloat in 
the face of adversity. Yet, directors were not considered great just 
because they revived a factories production level. Most commonly, a 
excellent leader was a "good" manager, with the ability to keep a 
factory or collective alive, and a "good" communist, demonstrating 
fatherly concern for the welfare of his subordinates.9 9
Positive relations with workers were necessary to be 
considered a very "effective" leader. Those who were simply 
directive in saving a factory or collective were simply "good" Soviet 
directors. Subordinates liked managers who revived or maintained 
plants to give life back to the workers, as opposed to the state. For 
example, Andeev was considered by his workers as "their leader, 
their truthful friend, and their best comrade" who cared for the 
needs of his workers .100 A manager by the name of Korshunov was 
revered in the same way. He was best known for diving off a barge 
and saving the life of a drowning worker. One worker claimed, 
"These are his qualities. He [Korshunov] loves his workers. he takes 
pride in them. cares about them as if he were their own father." 1 O l 
One director, Korolev, showed his care differently by installing 
98Koenker, Diane P. "Factory tales: narratives of industrial relations in the 
transition to NEP". The Russian Review. July, 1996. P 384-412. 
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electricity, a bathhouse, a barbershop, and a boot repair shop. 
Whether a leader improved the physical conditions of and around 
the factory or became involved in the lives of his subordinates, 
Russian workers praised managers who acted and lived as if they 
were workers themselves. 
"Effective" leaders in Russia interacted with all levels of 
subordinates, working directly with them to create a positive 
relationships with them. This direct contact between all levels of the 
hierarchy is considered a fundamental aspect of the Soviet 
management system and has far reaching effects. "On the positive 
side, it boosts morale, improves a leader's picture of what actually 
goes on in the organization and greatly enhances vertical integration 
in the organization."102 Unfortunately, this practice can hinder lateral 
communication. However, it is generally a positive aspect of the 
management system. "Even the general director of the enterprise is 
a walk-around, face-to-face manager, a task master and parent 
figure whose presence is felt everywhere, from the executive suite to 
the production floor."103
The most "effective" leaders in the Soviet Union believed that 
they were in the same class as their subordinates. Those leaders, 
who "spoke the workers' language" and were considered one of them, 
received much praise from their subordinates. For example, Fedor 
Gorbashov. director of a linen-weaving mill, was praised for acting 
102v1achoutsicos. Charalambos and Lawrence, Paul. "What we don't know 
about Soviet Management". Harvard Business Review. November-December, 
1990. P. 52. 
103VIachoutsicos, Charalambos and Lawrence, Paul. "What we don't know 
about Soviet Management". Harvard Business Review. November-December, 
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lilc:e a worker even though he was a director. One subordinate 
explained, "This is our brother, our native director, our brother• 
worker, not an engineer. We had specialists, but things were worse 
with them. With our director, things go better, we are all fed, and 
the factory produces more."104 Similarly, Dmitri Dudarev excelled as
a director because of his accessibility: "he had no separate office, any 
worker could come up to him, ... he listened to each one 
attentively." I 05 
Good directors had roots among their workers, understanding 
their needs. From material support, like food and clothing, to 
psychological support, like encouragement and praise, good directors 
were generous to their subordinates. This type of generosity was 
necessary in the Soviet Union. Leaders perceived their subordinate's 
biggest concern to be "help on personal problems. Based on what is 
known about the Soviet economy, housing, and food problems of the 
Russian worker, perhaps this is not surprising. "106 As leaders 
provide subordinates with support in many ways, "They develop 
direct bonds of loyalty with employees at all levels." I 07
Alexander Sergeovich Gorian, plant manager of a large engine 
manufacturing plant in Moscow, is a good example of a leader who 
shows concern for his employees at all levels. He knows most of the 
104Koenker, Diane P. ''Factory tales: narratives of industrial relations in the 
transition to NEP". The Russian Review. July, 1996. P 384-412. 
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2,000 people who work for him by their names. He also posts open 
office hours so individuals employees can voice their complaints or 
concerns. Although he is generally concerned about his employees 
first, Gorian must be directive at times. "Mr. Gorian's style is direct, 
confrontational and humorous - a blend of charisma and 
autocracy." 108
Most effective Soviet managers, like Gorian, were directive 
when necessary. "Red directors also had to raise worker productivity 
by reducing unexcused absences and restoring shop-floor 
discipline." l09 Yet, this directiveness was never taken at the expense
of a relationship. For example, one director "raised discipline not 
through punishment, but through example, because he was "one of 
them." 11 O An established positive relationship allowed leaders to be 
directive and productive. For example, a Russian director named 
Volkov "also introduced strict labor discipline, but his workers 
accepted this; they knew that ultimately he defended their 
interests ... " 111 However, considering the task less important then 
relationships, Soviet directors "perceive themselves as less likely to 
engage in exploitive power behaviors and as more rigid in their 
evaluations of ethical situations. "112 
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Productivity and discipline could only raise together in the 
subordinates trusted and respected their leader. Due to a lack of a 
performance based pay system, workers were motivated by the 
director only. Therefore, those leaders who gained the trust and 
respect of their subordinates and were supportive, relations­
oriented, humble managers and directors usually elicit high 
production performance, as well as subordinate satisfaction; and 
therefore, they are considered "effective". 
Russi.a 
The change of the economic system has created transformation 
in every aspect of enterprise, from leadership, to production, to 
followership. Paul Lawrence and Charalambos Vlachoutsicos, 
management scholars who have studied the Soviet system 
throughout the reform period, explain, "we cannot sufficiently 
emphasize how fundamental and all-encompassing this process of 
change is.11113 "The downfall of state-controlled, centrally planned 
industries meant that competition and supply and demand were the 
new economic watchwords."114 These new concepts required the 
attention of organizational leadership; and subordinates are receiving 
less of the focus of their leaders. "To succeed as a Russian manager 
today, connections alone are not enough. Managers must possess the 
specific skills needed to compete in the open market." 115
113Behind the Factory Walls. Edited by Paul R. Lawrence and Charalambos A.
Vlachoutsicos. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1990. P. 287. 
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A new playing field exists in Russia, industry is now driven by 
competition, efficiency, innovation and marketing. Leaders feel the 
change most immediately, as they find themselves in a position of 
responsibility, "being forced to compete in a competitive, market­
driven environment. 11 116 With the drastic reforms of the surrounding 
environment, leaders of enterprises must learn to change just as 
quickly. One manager explains, "managers must be retooled, re­
educated to help them understand and do different things .. .''117 
The most obvious change in leader behavior under the new 
economic system lies in the responsibility and ownership which 
leaders are taking. "State-owned enterprises used to be responsible 
for the welfare of their employees. This meant providing apartments 
and utilities, as well as running schools, hospitals and holiday 
camps." 118 Yet, now managers and their subordinates are 
responsible for the formerly state-owned enterprise. Leaders are no 
longer responsible for the welfare of their subordinates outside the 
factory or collective; they are now responsible to the bottom line, 
profit, and shareholders. 
Viktor Korovin, who became plant general director at 
Uralmash, maker of oil rigs, steel foundries, and earth movers, 
explains this phenomenon, "They [managers] are behaving like 
owners now, which means when they invest their own money they 
116Longenecker. Clinton 0. and Popovski, Sergei. "Managerial trials of 
privatization: retooling Russian managers". Business Horizons. November, 
1994. P. 35. 
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want return on it."119 Ownership has changed the perspective of 
leadership of Russian enterprise. 
Under the new system, a young breed of successful business 
leaders is emerging to meet these new responsibilities. "Managers in 
private companies tended to be younger and more proactive, flexible, 
entrepreneurial, and market-oriented than their state-run 
counterparts." 120 Chairman of Inkombank, Vladimir V. Vinogradov, 
explains, "Younger people are better able to adapt to fast-changing 
conditions. "121 Furthermore, characteristics of these young Russian 
managers include: "order givers, quick to act, sales background, 
problem-solvers, risk-takers, externally-oriented, consumer-
oriented, pay for performance, use promotional tools."122 
Business leaders in Russia who have remained successful in the 
face of this drastic change share certain skills. Technical business 
skills, such as knowledge of the plant's operation and production line, 
and conceptual skills, such as the ability to solve problems and 
effectively plan, have emerged as the most important skills in free­
market Russia. Interpersonal skills, such as making connections and 
contacts, while important, are not as highly valued in the capitalist 
environment. As monitoring and measuring progress and 
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profitability become essential, drive, persistence, and creativity are 
more characteristic of "effective" leaders.123
A common characteristic found in entrepreneurial leaders of 
this new era is an internal locus of control. Those emerging as 
business leaders in Russia "did locate control internally, and this 
perception of personal control dominated the control they felt coming 
from powerful others or from chance."124 Although this corresponds 
with the new concepts related to ownership, this was quite a surprise 
considering "Russian students were more likely to attach control to 
powerful others and to chance when compared to students from 
historically democratic countries." 125 Therefore, emerging Russian 
leadership feels a new sense of freedom and control under the 
capitalist system, although older citizens still reflect on the power of 
the "Communist Party". In Kaufmann, Welsh and Bushmarints study, 
these entrepreneurs, with an internal locus of control, also showed 
many of the characteristics listed above necessary to lead in 
enterprise; such as risk-taking, flexible, and aggressive. For example, 
Juri Oiemets, a former manager of a computer software state­
enterprise, "is typical of a whole new post-Soviet generation of 
123Longenecker, Clinton O. and Popovski, Sergei. "Managerial trials of
privatization: retooling Russian managers". Business Horizons. November, 
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wheeler-dealers: young, aggressive and, according to the complaint. 
not to scrupulous." 126 
In the past, managers could have complete disregard for 
quality and still succeed as leaders. Therefore, these leaders were 
more concerned with the quality of their subordinate relations. Yet, 
under the new economic system, promotion is based on performance, 
profits and the "bottom line". This changes the focus of leaders 
energies. Yet. subordinates understand this. For example, "after 
privatization, employees and managers together typically ended up 
with a 51 % stake in their companies."127 Therefore, subordinates 
often feel a sense of ownership and responsibility as well. Allowing 
subordinates to have a stake in the enterprise sparks motivation. 
11 Shareholders and managers have been empowered." 128
In a Harvard research study, this concept of improved 
motivation was tested and proved. When Russian workers were 
provided with extrinsic rewards contingent on their performance, 
they "were seen to 'shape their actions to increase these rewards." 12 9 
Therefore, this motivation technique proved to be an effective 
leadership behavior under the capitalist system; yet, under 
communism, this technique did not exist because all workers 
received the same rewards, regardless of performance. In the new 
126Klebnikov. Paul and Linden, Dana Wechsler. "So Sue Me". Forbes. August 
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system. workers are motivated by the performance based system, 
which incorporated bonuses, stock value, or pay increases. 
In accordance with testing the effects of extrinsic rewards, this 
study also tested the impact of behavioral management, which 
provided intrinsic rewards, on Russian subordinates. These intrinsic 
rewards included trained supervisors administering "social rewards 
(praise and recognition) and feedback when their workers performed 
identified functional behaviors". Their relationship-oriented 
leadership behaviors raised the levels of subordinate motivation. 
Although this type of behavior management was used under 
communism by 11effective 11 leaders, the impact of this "relations" 
behavior was just as great in increasing the motivation and 
satisfaction of subordinates. The extrinsic rewards behavioral 
technique and the behavioral management technique are U.S. human 
resource management theories and techniques which are capitalist 
by origin. These are also new and effective leadership behaviors 
which Russian leaders use to increase the motivation of their 
subordinates under the new economic system. 
Case Analysis 
Using Hersey and Blanchard's "situational leadership theory" as 
a template, the analysis of this case will consider follower "maturity" 
as the "situational moderator variable". Yet. the concept of maturity 
must be altered to address a macro-level situational determinant, 
like an economic system. For example, maturity level in this 
analysis. like Hersey and Blanchard, includes two components, job 
maturity and psychological maturity. Yet, from the perspective of 
this macro-level analysis, followers' knowledge and psychological 
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readiness to perform roles within an economic system determine the 
subordinates level of maturity. 
Altering the "sitautional moderator variable" to fit this 
application of Hersey and Blanchard's model is a technique used by 
scholars in adapting this theory to their studies. For example, in 
"Situational leadership: A modification of Hersey and Blanchard's 
model", 0. M. lrgens creates her own situational leadership theory 
using many aspects of Hersey and Blanchard's original model. Like 
this analysis, Irgens model alters Hersey and Blanchard's concept of 
the "situational moderator variable". Instead of considering 
subordinate maturity level as the basis for the appropriate 
leadership behavior, Irgens addresses follower qualifications as the 
determining variable,130 This adapted theory provides an example 
of following and modifying a theory of leadership. 
In the researcher's applied situational leadership theory, which 
incorporates a macro orientation, maturity measures the knowledge 
level and psychological readiness of subordinates in an economic 
system. After the inception of communism, follower's maturity 
levels rose, as they became more knowledgeable of their roles and 
more · psychologically ready to perform them. By the latter half of 
the 20th century, communist workers were most likely at their 
highest maturity levels. Even under Hersey and Blanchard's 
definition of maturity, Soviet subordinates would most likely be 
considered mature. Working in the same factory for life, and 
130Jrgens, 0. M. "Situational leadership: A modification of Hersey and 
Blanchard's Model". Leadership and Organizational Development Journal. 
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growing up in the communist environment, subordinates were well 
prepared to understand and perform their roles. 
With mature subordinates, Soviet managers/directors 
displayed more relationship-oriented behavior than task-oriented 
behavior. Although task behavior was an aspect of leadership in the 
Soviet Union, "effective" leaders raised levels of production and 
subordinate satisfaction by using relationship-oriented behaviors. 
While subordinates under communism were not as concerned with 
production as they were about feeding, housing, and providing 
clothing for their families, they worked to increase production for the 
community of the factory. Leaders who acted as if they were part of 
the community gained the love and respect of their subordinates. 
Gaining this love and respect was contingent on a leader's concern for 
follower welfare, ability to revive production, and interaction with all 
levels of subordinates. Directors, leaders. and managers were 
considered "effective" if they displayed concern for their 
relationships with employees. Therefore, relationship behavior, 
defined by Yuki as "opening channels of communication, providing 
socioemotional support, and giving 'psychological stokes"', emerged 
as the most commonly cited behaviors of "effective" leaders. An 
increase in this behavior produced more satisfaction and 
organizational loyalty from their subordinates, which indirectly lead 
to improved production through worker motivation and effort. 
Following the demise of communism and genesis of free­
market reforms in the Russia, the maturity level of subordinates fell 
to a low point as subordinates' job maturity and psychological 
maturity changed. Task maturity was relatively static because the 
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task relevant skills and technical knowledge level required was 
basically the same. Subordinates remained in their positions after 
the fall of the Soviet Union unless their factory shut down. Yet, the 
level of psychological maturity changed a great deal in the wake of 
reforms. The leader/follower relationship, which incorporated a 
"social contract", changed as workers produced for the factory or 
farm, and no longer for the state. Employment was no longer 
guaranteed and provided by the state. Furthermore, the leadership 
within a business organization was no longer party oriented. These 
factors have lowered the psychological maturity level of 
subordinates as they lose confidence in the permanency of their jobs. 
From a macro-level perspective, the maturity level of subordinates 
was low and rising as the Russian economic system slowly 
transformed to capitalism. 
With less mature subordinates, the dominant behavior pattern 
in Russia under the free-market system was task-oriented. The 
instillation of the "bottom line" in Russia changed the focus of Russian 
mangers from relationships to the task at hand. Having ownership in 
the venture, leadership became motivated to increase production, 
lower costs, and enjoy profits. Feeling like the level of production 
was under their control (the internal local of control factor), leaders 
became "order-givers", oriented to the external-market environment. 
"Effective" leaders used task behaviors in hopes of staying afloat 
under the new system. 
The relationship-oriented behaviors of leaders in Russia 
seemed to fall, as directive, task-oriented behaviors increased. 
Subordinates were expected to take care of their needs with the 
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income provided by the organization. No longer was the organization 
in charge of providing housing, education, etc. Yet, a level 
relationship-oriented behavior was still necessary as leaders needed 
the respect of their employees to motivate them. 
The results of this case study are not consistent with the 
11situational leadership theory" of Hersey and Blanchard. While 
Hersey and Blanchard argue that leaders should decrease relations 
and task behaviors as subordinate maturity increases beyond the 
moderate level (See Appendix A), Soviet managers did not decrease 
either. In fact, they seemed to provide high amounts of both. While 
maturity has taken on a different meaning in light of economic 
systems throughout this analysis, one would not expect this large of a 
difference to result from changing the components of maturity. 
While Hersey and Blanchard predict that a higher level of 
relationship-oriented behavior is considered "effective" when 
subordinates are immature, this was not the case in Russia. 
Managers in Russia were considered effective if they could provide 
direction in the times of constant change. Therefore, task behaviors 
increased as maturity level fell along with the communist system. 
Although there is no documented decrease in relations behavior, it is 
obvious that managers focused on the tasks, the level of production, 
and this new thing called "profit". 
In conclusion, Hersey and Blanchard's situational theory of 
leadership provided a theory to follow in this case study analysis of 
leadership behaviors in the Soviet Union and Russia. Unfortunately, 
the findings of this case study do not support Hersey and Blanchard's 
conclusions. However, this may be do to the different criteria used to 
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measure subordinate maturity. Exposure to the economic system 
determined maturity level in this study, and may have been a 
determinant inapplicable to their theory. Yet, the findings were 
convincing; Soviet managers seemed to use more relationship­
oriented behaviors while Russian managers seemed to show more 
task-oriented behaviors. 
Directions for Future Leadership Study 
Although this analysis incorporated the "situational leader 
theory" of Hersey and Blanchard, results suggest that other theories 
may apply. As stated before. most contingency theories of 
leadership are applicable because they take the situation, or 
environment into account; and an economic system can be considered 
an aspect of the situation. For example, Fiedler's LPC contingency 
model of leadership may apply because the change of the economic 
system would influence "situational favorability". Under the new 
system, the situation is most likely unfavorable to most. According 
to Fiedler, unfavorable situation would benefit the relationship­
oriented leader because leaders with high LPC scores are most 
effective in unfavorable situations. 
The path-goal theory of leadership could also apply to the 
evidence gathered. The reforms in the economic system would alter 
the "situational moderator variables", as characteristics of the task 
and environment changed. As the situational moderator variables 
changed. the most "effective" style of leadership would change as 
well. This applies to the situation in Russia where the new capitalist 
system resulted in a increase in directive behaviors. According to 
Yuki's analysis of this theory, "when ... subordinates are 
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inexperienced, and there is little formalization of rules ... then 
directive behavior will result in higher subordinate satisfaction and 
effort." l 31 In the communist system, this theory would predict that 
"when the task is ... boring, tedious, and dangerous, supportive 
leadership leads to increased subordinate effort and satisfaction ... " 13 2 
This case study seems to support the path-goal theory of leadership. 
As the examples above suggest, there is a need for a more in­
depth look at the impact of the changes in Russia on their leadership. 
This study only applied one contingency theory to the data gathered. 
Apparently, many other theories can be applied in a case . study of 
Russia. 
Limits of Analysis 
Naturally inherent of a case study, this analysis was subject to 
limitations. The multiple sources of evidence used to provide data 
were subject to the opinions of the authors. Furthermore, secondary 
data lacks a direct link between the researcher and the subject. 
Furthermore, data which incorporated Soviet-produced information, 
like the Keonker and Welsh, Luthans, and Sommer studies, are highly 
biased.133 The data was also biased by weight throughout this study. 
For example, most narratives about effective leadership were 
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incorporated in the "Communist Era11 section, while the "Capitalist 
Era" section contained few narratives, but many empirical studies. 
Beyond the data, this analysis experienced limitations with the 
assumptions related to the applied derivation of Hersey and 
Blanchard's "situational leadership theory. For example, other 
situational determinants exist and most likely had an influence on 
the situation; and, the resulting leadership behaviors. Also, there 
was an assumption of homogeneity within the environment of 
communism and capitalism. The macro analysis of Hersey and 
Blanchard's theory is limited by its assumptions, as well. 
This case study was meant to provide an analysis of leadership 
in Russia under great economic change. Although this paper does not 
provide conclusions, 
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